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It is not accidental that in New Zealand preference is given to the owner of the copyright 
at the expense of the author 1 of the work. New Zealand copyright law is a descendant of 
the United Kingdom's Statute of Anne2 which has more than once been called an 
owner's statute, and not an authors' statute. This is largely due to the political and social 
climate which surrounded its enactment.3 Due to this history we have a statute focusing 
on the economic rights attaching to the work. There is, however another group of rights 
which attach themselves to a work - the droit moral, or moral rights. Moral rights 
evolved in Continental jurisprudence largely through judge made law.4 The doctrine of 
moral rights focuses on the unique relationship between authors and their works and 
serves to protect the personal rights of authors as distinct from their purely pecuniary 
rights which nom1ally vest in a publisher or employer. The tenn moral rights is however 
somewhat of a misnomer as there is nothing particularly moral in the content of these 
rights, hence, the term moral as most would understand it is misleading. To curtail this 
practice, moral rights in this paper will be referred to as creator's-rights, a tenn which is 
more indicative of the nature and content of the rights. 
A number of rights are included when one speaks of creator's-rights. These include: the 
right of publication; the right of withdrawal of the work at any time; the right of paternity 
and the right of integrity.5 The latter two rights gained international significance when 
article 6bis was added to the 1928 Rome Revision of the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works·6 The Berne Convention is the source of New 
Zealand's treaty obligations for creator's- rights .7 
l 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
The term author will be used in this paper to rcl'cr to all creators of copyright work. 
C 19. 1709 (GB) . 
The publishers of the day. the stationers: "Who came up to Parliament in the form of petitioners 
with tears in their eyes. hopeless and forlorn: they brought with them their wives and children to 
invite compassion and induced Parliament to give them statutory security." D011aldso 11 v Beckel/ 
(1774) 2 Bro PC 129. I ER 837 at p843 per Lord Camden. See also Kaplan A11 Unhurried \liew 
of Copyrighl (Columbia University Press 1961) Ch I. 
Sec R Sarraute .. Current Theory on the Moral Rights of Authors and Artists Under French Law" 
(1968) 16 Am J Comp Law 465. 
Sec the discussion of the classical moral rights doctrine and traditional examples in J Merryman 
'The Refrigerator of Bcmw·d Buffet" ( 1976) 27 Hast LJ l 023 at p I 029. 
The other major copyright convention. the Universal Copyright Convention 1952, which New 
Zealand acceded to at inception docs not expressly mention creator's-rights. Full texts of both 
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The purpose of thi s paper is to examine New Zealand compliance with the obligations 
imposed by aiticle 6bis. Article 6bis requires recognition of the right of paternity and the 
right of integrity. The nature and purposes of these two rights will be briefly canvassed. 
The consideration of protection of these two rights in accordance with the requirements 
of a1ticle 6bis will involve an examination of a diverse area of law, which will include: 
contract; copyright; the personal torts; defamation and the right of privacy, and the 
economic torts; unfair competition, passing off and the Fair Trading Act 1986. The 
reason such a wide area of law must be considered is because New Zealand has not 
codified the protection it offers to creator ' s-rights, due to the belief these areas of law 
provide the protection required by article 6bi s. Where poss ible, New Zealand 
compliance with article 6bi s will be highlighted using the topical film colourisation 
technique.8 It will be illustrated that the protection New Zealand currently provides does 
not satisfy the obligations imposed by articl e 6bi s. The non compliance with the 
requirements of article 6bi s appears of little con sequence, in so far as the Berne 
Convention provides no disciplinary or enforcement procedures. However, it will be 
suggested that the inclusion of TRIPS9 in GA TT 10 could alter this, with the adoption of 
the 1971 Paris Revision as the appropriate international copyri ght standard . Article 6bis 
7 
8 
9 
10 
conventions can be found in The United Nations. Educational. Scientific. and Cultural 
Organisation and World lntcllcctual Propert y Organisa tion. Copyright Laws and Treaties of the 
World Volume lII ( 1990). 
New Zealand has been bound by the Berne Convention since it s inception in 1886 due to our 
relationship with the United Kin gdom and then in our own ri ght since 1928. The Berne 
Convention was ori ginall y signed in 1886 to prevent international piracy of works. Berne 
countri es adhere to a principle of national treatment. which means that the authors o f each 
contracting nation enjoy in other countries the same protec tion that co untry grants to their own 
authors. For more detailed commentary on the Berne Convention sec S Ricketson Th e Bern e 
Co11Fe11tio11 fin· the Protection of Literory and ArtiJtic Works 1886 - 1986 (The Law Book Co. 
Sydney. 1987) . 
This is the application of co lour to old black and white film s. which has come under substantial 
atlack in the United States. In this paper the focus will be on the direc tor as the primar y creati ve 
force behind the work/ this theory was first articulated by French film criti cs writing in Cahicrs du 
Cinema. Sec J Caughic 'J"/1eorie.1 of A11tlwrs/1ip (Roullcgc & Keegan Paul Ltd . L ondon. 198 1) B 
Bclazs Th eory of the Fi/111 (Dover Publica tion Inc. cw York . 1970),which is still recognised by 
the current practice of grantin g academy awards to direc tors.) objec ting 10 ha ving their name and 
reputation associated with the altered work. 
Trade Related A spec ts of lntcll cc tual Propert y. Sec further di scuss ion below n 137 and 
accompanying tex t. 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. October 19-+7. 6 1 T IA S No 17000 UNTS 187. Sec 
below n 137 and accompanying tex t. 
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of the 1971 Paris Revision increases the protection required to be given to creator's-
rights. Any accession by New Zealand to this later revision will involve alteration to the 
protection currently offered to creator's-rights. The paper will conclude by suggesting 
that New Zealand should enact creator's-rights legislation, not only in compliance with 
treaty obligations, but as a matter of policy, for New Zealand is a country proud of its 
cultural heritage and should provide some legislative protection for its' creators. 
THE PURPOSE OF THE CREATOR'S-RIGHTS DOCTRINE 
Before discussing compliance with article 6bis it is perhaps helpful to gain an insight into 
the role that creator's-rights serve. The doctrine focuses on the protection of the author's 
personality which is said to be inseparable from the work. As Yaver comments11 "this 
metaphysical conception of moral rights, with its idealistic view of art and literature, may 
be useful as taxonomy but does not adequately explain the purpose of the doctrine." 
Yaver continues and identifies a number of the less metaphysical purposes of the 
docttine. 
(l)An economic basis, which he describes as a 'truth in marketing' legislation. The 
public are entitled to be told the truth about a works authorship, and are entitled to have 
the work in the form that the author intended it. This, Yaver analogises to the 
functioning of a trademark. People rely on marks as the sign of a good brand or of a 
certain quality and are thus willing to pay more. 12 By acknowledging who created a 
work and by keeping it in its original form, he concludes "moral rights help to create and 
maintain a market in which consumer choice is more accurately channelled". 13 This can 
be illustrated by Leaf v /11rematio11al Golleries 1-l where the representation that the work 
11 
12 
13 
14 
D Vnver "Author's Moral Rights ancl the Copyright Law Review Committee's Report : W[HJither 
Such Rights Now?" (1988) 14 Monash L Rev 284 at p286. 
Leaf,• !11temotio110/ Galleries 11950] 2 KB 86 at p92 . 
Above n 11 at p288. 
[1950] 2 KB 86. 92. 
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was a Constable went to the root of the contract and induced the plaintiff to buy the 
painting. 
(2)The public interest in the functioning of a market place coincides with the authors own 
interest in gaining the reward the public are willing to confer by fame and fortune. 15 The 
author should bear the risks of the marketplace, and be entitled to reap the benefits of 
their own labour. In cases where the work of an employee is credited to the employer, 
both the author, and the public miss out; the author on recognition , and the public on 
infonnation from which they can make an infonned choice. 
(3)The bargaining power of creative people will be advanced. Without creator's-rights 
the author has nothing to bargain about. 16 If granted creator's-rights by legislation it will 
encourage the judiciary to monitor waiver clauses for restraint of trade, unconscionability 
and undue influence.17 
(4)The preservation of cultural heritage; " IMJonuments of human culture lare] an 
essential palt of our common past. They tell us who we are and where we came from." 18 
If works are preserved accurately we can learn much of our past. 
These four purposes enunciated by Yaver illustrate clearly the wider role creator's-rights 
play in the functioning of the creative market. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Above n 11 at p288. 
Above n 11 at p289. 
D Vaver "Author's Moral Rights - Reform Proposals in Canada: Ch:u·ter or Barter of Rights for 
Creators?'' ( 1988) 25 Osgoode Hall L Rev 749. at pp774-779 for criti cism of the operation or 
these doctrines. 
Above n 5 at pl895 
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II ARTICLE 6BIS OF THE BER E CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION 
OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS - 1928 ROME REVISION 
Atticle 6bis prescribes the content and extent of protection required for creator's-rights to 
be accorded to authors of contracting states. Article 6bis of the Rome text of the Berne 
Convention provides: 
(l)Indepcndently of the author's copyright. and even after the transfer of said copyright. the author 
shall have the right to claim authorship of the work. as well as the right to object to any 
distortion. mutilation or other modification of the said work which would be prejudicial to his 
honour or reputation. 
(2) The determination of the conditions under which these rights shall be exercised is reserved for 
the national legislature of the countries of the Union. The means of redress for safeguarding these 
rights shall be regulated by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed. 
The obligations of article 6bis have generally been viewed as uncertain by the common 
Jaw countries and the comment of the Whitford Committee is pertinent in that; "fWJhether 
our law has ever been fully satisfactory to meet our obligations depends on how we 
construe the obligations of article 6bis." 19 However, some statements on the 
requirements of article 6bis can be made on the nature of the rights, the right of paternity, 
the right of integrity and the mode of protection required . 
A. The Rights Recognised by Article 6bis. 
1. The nature of the rights 
The independence of creator's-rights from economic rights is made clear in paragraph 
(1). The exercise of these rights is not dependent upon the ownership of the economic 
rights in the work. 20 Under the classical doctrine, creator's-rights were inalienable. This 
was due to the personal nature of the rights which continues in article 6bis and is 
indicated by the wording of paragraph ( 1) which states; " ... I P]rejudicial to his honour or 
reputation" (emphasis added). If the rights are personal at common law then the whole 
19 
20 
Copyright and Design Law - Report to the Committee to Consider the Law on Copyright and 
Designs M<u·ch Cmnd 6732 ( 1977). where they did recognise th.it moral rights should be included 
in British law. ssSl-57. Sec comments in M Nimmer .... ,mrlications of the Prospective 
Revisions of the Berne Convention and the United States Copyright Law" (1967) 19 Stan L Rev 
499 at p522. 
However it has been argued that paragraph( I) predicates the case where initially both rights vest in 
the author. Argument raised by D V:.iver .. Author ' s Moral Rights in Canada .. ( 1983) 14 IIC 329 at 
pp353-354. 
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or partial assignment of these rights would be void due to the principles of champe1ty and 
maintenance. 21 Yet, paragraph (1) does not expressly state whether the rights are 
inalienable, that is, despite what the author agrees to by contract when transferring 
economic rights , that the creator's-rights can be exercised afterwards. Under article 
6bis(2) New Zealand is given the right to determine the conditions under which these 
rights may be exercised and the remedies available for their protection, yet this would not 
seem to include the right to change their character by making them alienable.22 Nimrner23 
claims that literally construed the provision means only that a translation of economic 
rights did not of itself transfer the creator's-rights, yet the materials cited by 
. . 
1mmer 111 
argument state only that creator's-rights can be regulated by agreement but not assigned 
or totally renounced . Two possible scenarios spring to mind . Firstly, if the contract 
says that the adapter can turn the particular novel into a play in any form which appears 
appropriate, the author of the work can object when the play is read. Conversely, if the 
author simply transfers the economic rights, then the creator's-rights will not also have 
been u·ansferred unless the contract says so explicitly. The latter approach would seem 
preferable and is in accord with the interpretation of the French24 and English25 courts. 
This view is supported when one examines the general report of the Rome Revision as it 
is stated that there was a general understanding that the rights spoken of under article 6bis 
should not be transferable or capable of relinqui shement. 26 Vaver comments that despite 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Above note 17 at p773. 
Above n 17 p77 l . 
Above n 19 at p524. 
See discussion in; P Amarick. "American Rccogni1ion of the Moral Right - Issues and Options" 
(1979) 29 ASCAP Copy L Symp 3 I at p-+7. 
Frisby v Britis!, Brnoclcasti11g Corpomtio11 [ 19671 Ch 932 The plaintiff was the author of a 
television play. A dispute arose over the inclusion or a particular line which the defendants 
believed would give offence and which the plaintiff believed was essential 10 the play. lnterim 
relief was granted in favour or the plain1irr based on 1he construction or the contract between the 
two parties. The court placed reliance on Joseph ,. National Maga::.i11e Co Ltd f 1959] Ch 14; 
(1958) 3 WLR 361: [19581 3 All ER 52 that th e co urts will readily imply a term that no 
substantial alterations may be made to a signed :1rticle without the authors consent. There is a 
distinction between a license agreement where an allcration may be in breach of the license and a 
transfer of copyright where :1lterations ca n be made as long as they do not injure the reputation of 
the author. Sec also CJ,oplin v Leslie, . Frew11 (Puhli.1//ers) Lie/ [ 1967] Ch 932. 
General Report on the Rome Diplomatic Conference for 1he Revision of the Berne Convention E 
P Caselli reprinted in A Bogsch 1'!,e Berne Co111·e11tio11 J<Jr tl,e Protertio11 of Literary and Artistic 
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the failed attempts to make the rights inalienable at the 1948 Conference this does not 
change the position under the ] 928 Revision and subsequent revisions of the 
Convention. 27 The nature of creator's-rights that the convention mandates suggests that 
assignments are implicitly prohibited and that while contracts regulating the exercise of 
creator's-rights for a particular a-ansaction may be valid, states may be compelled to hold 
total waivers of such rights as void because they are incompatible with the policy of 
aiticle 6bis.28 
2. The right ofpaternity (the right to claim authorship). 
It is ai·gued that the right of paternity comprises three subrights, these include: (1) The 
right to require that the author's work carry the authors name: (2) The right to prohibit the 
use of another's name in connection with the author's work; (3) The right to prohibit the 
use of the authors name in connection with a work the author did not create. 29 Nimmer 
comments30 that an author has the right to claim authorship when the author has the 
ability to prevent others from being represented as the author of the work and may also 
prevent a false representation that he is the author of another persons work. Yet as 
Ricketson comments, paragraph(l) requires that a positive right to claim authorship be 
given, and that there was nothing in the reports on the Rome, Brussels or Stockholm 
conference to indicate otherwise.3 1 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
Works: From 1886 10 1986 ( lnternati on:li Bureau or Intellectual Property. Geneva. 1986) at p l 71. 
It i s permiss ible look at such report s 10 interpret trea ti es due 10 art 32 or Vienna Convention or 
the Law or Treaties 1969 which although 1101 strictl y applicable. as it came into force after th e 
1928 Rome Revision . is sa id 10 enac t cus tomary trea ty interpreta tion principles. As A McNair 
correctly comments 'IT!here is no part of the la w of trea ti es which !he] approaches with more 
11·epidatio11 than the question or imerpretation · Low oj"f'reolies (Clarendon. Oxford. I 96 l ) at p364. 
Above n 17 at p772. 
Above note 17 at p772. 
M Roeder "The Doctrine of Moral Rights - A Study in the Law of Artists. Authors and Creators" 
( 1940) 53 Harv Law Rev 554 at pp56 l -562 . In this paper the ri ght of paternity will refer only to 
the positive ri ght to claim authorship. 
Above 11 19 p522. 
S Ricketson "ls Australia in Breach of its International Obligations with Respect 10 the Protection 
of Moral Rights" ( 1990) 17 Melb L Rev 462 at p-173. 
1 1 
3. The right of integrity (the right to object to any distortion, mutilation or other 
modification of tlze said work prejudicial to lzo11011r or replltation) 
This right refers to changes made to the work. Nimmer argues that the elements must be 
construed in such a way as to preclude some recoveries which a literal reading of article 
6bis(l) would justify, citing the example that a literal construction would mean that an 
author could claim his rights are violated if someone who has purchased a copy of his 
book mutilates or destroys the copy.32 It appears that Nimmer may have misconstrued the 
paragraph as any such alteration to the work must be prejudicial to honour or reputation 
and it is unclear whether aiticle 6bis covers destruction of the work. 
The standard 'prejudicial to his honour or reputation' was regarded at the time of the 
1928 Rome revision to be similar to the personal interests protected in the common law 
jurisdictions by the defamation action.33 The phrase can thus be detennined objectively, 
however it is open for states to interpret the phrase more subjectively. 34 
It is unclear whether destruction of the work is covered by paragraph (I), likewise under 
the classical doctrine the status of destruction of a work was unclear. It would seem that 
destruction is a matter of policy to be decided by the individual signatory countries. 
4. The mode ofprotection. 
By paragraph (2) the mode of protection is a matter of the signatories discretion. New 
Zealand at present claims that the combination of legislation and common law actions 
adequately provide creator's-rights protection in compliance with article 6bis. 35 
32 
33 
34 
35 
Above n 19 p522. 
Above note 31 p474 
Sec below in context or the right or integrity the discussion or the stand:u·d. also the judgement of 
O'Brien J in S11oll' v Tltc Eaton Cenln' 1982 70 CPR (2d) I 05 (Ont H Ct) where considerable 
weight was given to the author's own views or the infringement and testimony from the art 
community and members or the public. 
Canada pursuant 10 its perceived obligations under Berne ( 1928 Rome Revision) enacted moral 
rights provisions in its Copyright Act (RSC 1970) which has since been amended (RSC l 985). 
The United Kingdom in the rewrite or the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 enacted 
specific moral rights legislation (Paris text 1971 ). in Australia the Copyright Review Committee 
in its .. Report on Moral Rights .. I 988 concluded by a majority or five to four that Australia 
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B. Prelimi11c11y Obserl'ations as to Complian ce 
Ricketson cites a number of preliminary observations when considering the question of 
Ausu·alian compliance with aiticle 6bis which are equally applicable in the New Zealand 
contexr.36 Briefly, they are as follows: 
(1) As a matter of treaty interpretation the obligatory nature of the requirements of article 
6bis are clear due to the unambiguous wording of article 6bi s(l). 
(2) The obligations exist in respect of foreign authors and works claiming protection in 
New Zealand pursuant to the convention.37 
(3) Treaty obligations in New Zealand need to be directly implemented into municipal 
law so that they can be invoked in court. In ew Zealand thi s involves a consideration 
of a number of different areas of law. 
(4) If New Zealand fails to comply with article 6bi s the Rome text of Berne fail s to 
provide a method of enforcement. 
presentl y satisfied its moral ri ghts obligations under Berne (Paris tex t 197 1 ). a move criticised by 
D Yaver above n 11 . The United States recentl y acceded to the Pari s tex t of the Berne Convention 
without enacting any spec ific lcg isbtion relying on ex istin g law has not gone uncriti cised. sec M 
Landau '"Colourization. Copyri ght and Moral Rights. A United States Perspec ti ve·· ( 1990) 5 IPJ 
215 at pp242-244. 
36 Above n 3 1 p477 et se4. Australi a too. claims that traditi onal form s of action ensure its 
compliance with art 6bis of the 197 1 Paris Revision. 
37 The article docs not menti on the protec tion to be accorded to national authors. Yet as Ricketson 
points out it is difficult to imagine as situation where a national Parliament would dec ide to treat 
foreign authors and their works more fa vourably than that of their nationals. A bove n 3 1 at p477. 
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C. Compliance With Article 6bis 
New Zealand at present does not expressly recognise the doctrine of creator's-rights and 
relies on the protection offered by non specific legislation and common law actions to 
protect the right of paternity and the right of integrity. It will be seen that these do not 
provide the protection required by article 6bis. 
1. The right of paternity (the right to claim authors/zip) - methods of compliance 
(a) Contract 
One of the major arguments raised against the introduction of creator's-rights legislation, 
is that they are a matter more appropriately left to contract. It is clear that one can bargain 
for the inclusion of almost any interest in a contract and that such will be enforceable by 
the courts unless illegal or contrary to public policy. However, the possibility of relying 
on contract as a means of creator's-rights protection to claim authorship in the context of 
black and white films and other works presupposes that the author is either the copyright 
owner or that there is a contractual relationship between the author and the copyright 
owner. 
A number of problems exist in assessing the value of the work and of the creator's-
rights. It is likely that any requests the author makes will reduce the value of the work to 
the publisher or producer as the room for exploitation of the work decreases . Authors 
new to the field are therefore vulnerable to exploitation and have a poor, if not, 
nonexistent bargaining position for the inclusion of creator's-rights in the contract, as 
not only is there little value in their names but the value of their works is uncertain. This 
may often lead to the waiver or assignment of the rights, despite the fact such is arguably 
inconsistent with the policy of Berne. Clearly, the well known author is in a much 
stronger bargaining position, as a publisher will want to use the author's name due to the 
reputation and sales brought with it. 
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(b)The Copyright Act 1962 
Independent of copyright ownership is section 62 of the Copyright Act, which provides 
protection against false attribution of authorship. 38 This section is enforceable as a 
statutory duty39 and is yet to be considered by a court in New Zealand. Section 62 is of 
limited scope as it does not apply to the makers of sound recordings, cinematographic 
films and television or sound broadcasts, thus cutting out protection for a large number 
of authors, also, despite section 62(1) which states that any reference to a work shall be 
taken to be a reference to a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, both subsections 
(4) and (6) refer explicitly to anistic works. 
In the context of film colourisation there is a possibility of protection for the author. It is 
possible for a cinematographic film to claim protection under the categories of either 
dramatic or aitistic works, as most black and white films pre date the Act and rely on the 
Copyright Act 1913 for protection.4° Cinematograph films were first protected under the 
1913 Copyright Act as dramatic works, or, alternatively cinematography was considered 
to be a form of photography, so films were able to have the same protection as 
photographs under the 1913 Act.4 t These sections determine who the author of the work 
is and who can enforce the statutory duty . 
Section 62(2) is aimed at the affixing of another's name on the work of which that person 
is not the author to imply that in fact that person is the author. The name must be affixed 
to the work and section 62(2) does not extend to the situation where the work, or 
reproductions of the work are otherwise passed off as being the work of a particulai· 
author by implication.4:! In the case of film colourisation there is usually attribution to 
both the director of the black and white film and the artist who added colour to the film. 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
Sec Appendix I for full text or sec t ion 62. 
Section 62(8). 
Clauses 14. 15 and 16 or the First Schedule Copyright Act 1%2. 
Section 3 or the 1913 Act gave copyright protection to "ori gina l. literary. dramatic. musical and 
artistic works ... Section 2 defined artistic works as including photographs. 
Sec later discussion in the context of sec tion 62(4 ). 
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This practice is unlikely to breach the statutory duty as the information is quite accurate. 
The director's authorship is attributed to the original black and white film and the 
colouriser's authorship is attributed to the colourised film. 
Section 62(4) applies only to artistic works and refers to the situation where a copyright 
work has been altered by a person other than the original author of the work and passed 
off as the work of the original author. This situation would typically arise where the 
author licences the making of an adaption and it is so ld by the licensee as the author's 
unaltered work. Two early English cases considering section 7(4) of the Fine Arts 
Copyright Act 1862 (UK)43 are of aid in the interpretation of section 62(4) due to the 
substantial similarity of content of the sections. 
The first is Preston v Raphea/ Tuck & Sons,44 where an artist sold two titled drawings 
and the copyright to the defendant who reproduced the drawings and they were sold 
unaltered in the form of calendars under the name of the artist. Later the defendant cut 
off portions of the margin , made them oval or round, instead of square, changed the 
colour and pattern of the picture, altered the title and removed the artist's name. The 
claim for an injunction failed as it was held that the conditions of publishing or selling the 
altered work had to be such as to make a representation either expressly, or by necessary 
implication, that the work published or sold was the authors unaltered work. The fact 
that the artist's work was of a distinctive style and recognisable to a number of people did 
not enable it to fall within the subsection. 
43 
44 
Section 7(4) ... Wl1ere the Author or 111akff ofa11y /}(ti111i11g, dmll'i11g or plwtograph, or 11ega1i,·e of 
a p/101ograph .. . shct!I ha,·e sold or othffll'ise 11cnted with posses:,ion of .1urh Cl ll'Ork, if w,y 
a/1erntio11 shcJ/1 ajien\'(/u/s he 111wlt' tht'rein hy w11· other person. h_,. addition or othenl'ise, 110 person 
shall be lit liherty during the life of the c1111/10r or maker of such ll'ork.1. 11 ·i1/10u1 his co11se111 , to 
make or k11oll'i11gly sell or puhlish or oj(erji1r sole, such H'Ork or co11ies of .111ch work so altered llS 
lljoresllid, or of any part thereof. as orji1r the u11C1/tered ll'ork of .rnch w11hor or maker. 
[1926) Ch 667. 
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The second case interpreting the section is Carlton Illustrations v Coleman & Co Ltd 45 
in this case the artist made a fine line drawing which was signed by him for the 
defendants to use in an advertisement. The defendants enlarged and coloured the sketch, 
and copies of it with the artist's name were displayed in advertisement of the product. 
The defendants had also changed the face of the woman portrayed. The artist had not 
contemplated that the sketch would be coloured, stating that if he had, the picture would 
have been different. The artist received damages of 10/. and an undertaking in lieu of an 
injunction. The comment was made that for the work to come within the section the 
change must be a material one, which would effect the reputation of the author if it was 
held out to have been his unaltered work.46 Ricketson comments that there is no 
justification for adding such a gloss, as all that is necessary on the plain reading of the 
section is for the work to have been sold as the authors unaltered work, adding this gloss 
places a greater burden on the plaintiff.47 
The view expressed by Ricketson was not considered in the recent Ausu·alian case 
Crocker v Papunya Tula Artists Pty Ltd 48 where the view expressed in Carlton was 
accepted by Morling J.49 The changes made in the title of the work and the removal of 
the introduction were not material alterations, and the placement of the plaintiff's name on 
the frontispiece was not a representation that the defendant had published the work as the 
unaltered work of the plaintiff.50 A further gloss was added in that Morling J suggested 
that a different view may have been reached had the work been a treatise rather than a 
catalogue as the reader may then assume that it is the author's unaltered work. 51 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
[ 1911 J 1 KB 771 
Above n 45 p780 per Channel J. 
S Ricketson The Law of !nteller111al Propeuy (The Law Book Co. Sydney. 1984) at para. [15.68J. 
(1985) 7 A TPR 40-582 
Above n 48 at p46-720. 
Above n 48 at µ46-721 citing Pre.11011 at p674 per Tomlin J. 
Above n 48 at p46-721. 
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In the context of film colourisation, the black and white film has been altered since it left 
the director, initially through editing and more recently by colourisation. Under the 
interpretation placed on alteration in Carlton the initial alteration would fail the 'material 
alteration, which would effect the author's reputation test' however it is arguable that 
colourisation may be such an alteration. On the second limb, is there a representation that 
the film is the unaltered work of the director? There is unlikely to be such a 
representation for two reasons; firstly, the commonly known industry practice of editing 
the film, and, secondly the film will be promoted as a colourised film, which clearly 
suggests that the work is altered. 
Section 62(6) provides that in an artistic work in which copyright subsists, there cannot 
be dealings with a work as a reproduction made by the author, if to the knowledge of the 
other person, it is not a reproduction made by that author. The marketing of the 
colourised film, The Asphalt Jungle 'as directed by John Huston', by Turner's 
Entertainment Co would be conduct which would bring the section into operation. The 
colourised film is a reproduction of the original black and white film. The definition of 
reproduction is provided by section 2 as "including a version produced by converting the 
work into a three dimensional form or if three dimensional by converting it into a two 
dimensional form"(emphasis added). As Brown and Grant comment, the scope of the 
restricted act is left for the courts to determine on the facts. 52 The additional fact that 
Turner's Entertainment Co knew that the reproduction was not made by the director, as 
they did the colourisation fulfils the knowledge requirement of section 62(6). 53 However 
if the film is marketed as; 'The Asphalt Jungle as colourised by Turners Entertainment 
Co', there would be no breach of statutory duty . 
52 
53 
A Brown. A Grant 'J'he Loi\' of /111ellffl110/ f'm11er1 y in Ne11· /.eoland (Buttcrworths. 
Wcllington.1989) at p359. 
Sec the discussion of the case in the wider creator's-rights context in M Landau above n 35 at pp 
247-252. 
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There is no guidance provided as to the to be applied when assessing damages. In 
Moore v The News of the World, 5-4 a case considering the comparable United Kingdom 
provision, section 43 of the Copyright Act 1956, the plaintiff was entitled to something 
for having the annoyance and irritation of having somebody take the liberty of passing 
off a newspaper article as hers, and 100 pounds was not considered to be an excessive 
sum.55 Thus some concern of the plaintiffs feelings will be taken into account. 
It can be seen that section 62 is very limited in scope and operation. It does not operate 
to give authors the positive right to have their name associated with their work. Instead it 
protects authors against having another's name associated with their work and having 
their name associated with the work of anothers. In this respect section 62 does not 
comply with the requirements of paragraph( I) of article 6bis. Furthermore, the author's 
ability to claim false attribution of authorship does not extend to works held in private 
collections. In this situation a director or other author could not claim the protection of 
the section despite the fact that the work had in fact been falsely attributed. This would 
appear inconsistent with the policy of Berne, as no mention is made in article 6bis of the 
circumstances where the rights cease to exist, nor were there any such restrictions under 
the classical doctrine. 
Positive attribution is required in two occasions under the Copyright Act, in criticism or 
review 56 and in the case of newspaper reporting. 57 These require sufficient 
acknowledgement to be given. Sufficient acknowledgement is defined in section 2 to 
mean: 
54 
55 
56 
57 
[A]n acknowledgement of the work or o ther subjec t matter in question by its titl e or other 
description and, unless the work is anonymous or the author or maker has previously agreed that 
no acknowledgement or his name should he made. also identify the author or maker" 
(1972) I QB441. 
Above n 54 at p450. 
Section 19(2). 
Section 19(3). 
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It is unfortunate and odd that the specified situations are so very limited , as if such a 
section was applied to all categories of creative works there would be compliance with 
the right to claim authorship mentioned in article 6bis. 
(c) Defamation 
An action for defamation58 is not limited to aspersions made upon an individual's private 
character but also embraces disparagement of reputation in trades, professions or other 
offices.59 If there is an attribution of an inferior work to the author, the author may well 
feel that their paternity interest has been damaged and may wish to use defamation for the 
protection of the personal interest one has in one's reputation . In Ridge v English 
Illustrated Magazine60 a story was published in a magazine under the plaintiffs name 
when in fact the plaintiff was not the author. The reputation of the plaintiff in this case 
had been established for some time. The court found it difficult to say what harm had 
occuned but did recognise that it would effect the price paid to the author for hi s works 
and granted an award of damages.61 
At present the Jaw offers no right of retraction for the defamed person, which in the case 
of film directors would involve the removal of their name from the colourised version. 
Defamation does not provide a positive right to claim authorship and instead focuses on 
granting a remedy for the use of the name based on the standard of harm to reputation, 
this imposes additional requirements than those mandated by article 6bis. 
58 An action for defamation rc4uircs that : a defamatory statement have been made: that the statement 
was made about the plaintiff: that the statemen t was published. Sec S Todd (eel) The Lall' of Torts 
in New 'l.ca/a11cl (The Law 8(X)k Co. Sydney. 1991 ) at pp682 et seq . 
59 J Fleming The Lall' of'Fou.,· 7th ed ( Thi.! Law Book Co. Sydney. 1987)al p502. 
60 (19l3)TLR592 
6! The availability of injunctive relief ex ists however not under the principles of Amerirnn 
Cya11i111icle Co Ethico11 Lief [ 1975] AC 396, but instead under Bo1111arcl v Perryman .[ 189 lJ 2 Ch 
209. It would appear thm an interim injunction will not be granted if there is any doubt that the 
words arc not defamatory. However the High Cou11 have awarded a number of interim injunctions. 
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(d) Invasion of privacy 62 - the right of publicity 
The right of publicity evolved from Prosser's fourth category of privacy63 and now 
encompasses commercial damage to the business value of a person's identity.6-+ The 
effect of the appropriation of personality decisions is to recognise or create an exclusive 
right in the individual plaintiff of a species of tradename in his or her own name and a 
kind of trademark in his or her likeness.65 The action stems from the proprietary interest 
that one has in one's identity. The action recognises this interest and protects it from 
economic exploitation. Hence an author could seek to prevent the unauthorised use of 
their name or likeness in connection with a work not created by them, or, a work 
subsequently altered, as a violation of a right of publicity. The limiting factor is that the 
author must show damage or the likelihood of damage, this suggests that an author will 
need a commercially saleable reputation and the action will not therefore be available to 
those just beginning their literary and artistic careers. 
62 
63 
64 
65 
The evolu1ion of !he right of privacy began with the article wrillen by S Warren & L Brandeis 
"The Right to Privacy .. ( I 890) 4 Harv L Rev I 93. According to D Prosser "Privacy" (l 960) 48 
Cal L Rev 383.389 there arc four categories comprising the law of privacy: ( l) intrusion upon the 
seclusion. solitude or private affairs of another person: (2) public disclosure or emlxu-rassing facts 
concerning another person: (3) publicity which places another person m a false light in the publics 
eye and )4) appropriation of ~lllothers name or likeness for personal gain. This fourth category is 
commonly referred to as a right of publicity. Of relevance in the moral rights context arc category 
(3)falsc light privacy and (4)appropriation of personalit y. 
Above n 62. 
The trend in the United Slates is to recognise such as an assignable and descending property right. 
It would seem that the director could argue that the use of his or her name in the advertising of the 
colourised film is an appropriation of personality. A sep:m11c action in exists in both the United 
States and Canada. In At/ions v Ca11oclia11 Ad1·c111111"e C111111s Lief I 1977 J 80 DLR (3d) 583 use of a 
well known print of the plaintiff was used as the basis of a sketch used to advertise the camps. 
Citing Krouse v Chrysler Ltd et ul -W DLR (3d) 15 the Canadian court moved from defamation 10 
a broadly based common law tort. While in the United States a large body of law is 
increasing.(see G Armstrong "The Reification of a Celebrity .. Persona as Property .. ( I 99 I) 51 
Lous L Rev 443). In the recent case of Mid/er 1· Ford Motor Co 849 F 2d 460 (9th Cir 1988) 
where the defendants were sued for the unauthorised use of l'vlidler's voice the courts recognised that 
what the defendants had :ippropriatcd was not theirs and had commillcd a ton in California. 
Problematic is that generally those who have participated in the creation or a work generally grant 
rights for the use of their names and personal features in connection with the exhibition and 
promotion of the work which effectively prohibits such an action. Sec C Wagner "Motion 
Pictures. Authenticity and the Elusive Moral Ri ght " ( 1989) 6-+ YUL Rev 628 at p675 in the 
conlexl of the colourisation debate. 
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Although categorised by Prosser as a fourth right of privacy, Burrows66 argues that it is 
really a protection of a right of property and its infringement will often amount to 
commercial exploitation akin to the tort of passing off and indeed it has been covered by 
such. 67 there is also the possibility of an action under section 968 and 1369 of the Fair 
Trading Act 198670 and defamation.71 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
Above 11 59 ::it p756. P Keeton (cd) Prosser & Kee1011 011 ·rous (Seel. West Publishing Co. 
Minncsot::i. 1984) at p854 comments that it is pointless to dispute over whether or not such a 
right is to be classified as property as it is al lc::isl clearly propric1my in 11a1urc ::is once something 
has been prolcctcd by the law it is a right of value upon which a plaintiff c::in capitalise by selling 
licences. 
The Australian case of l/e11derso11 v Radio Corpora/ion Pry LICI ( 1960) SR 9 NSW 576 is often 
cited as the beginnings of this new tort. In this case two professional ball room dancers sought an 
injunction to rcstr::iin the defendant from distributing and selling a record couple on which the two 
were pictured in a dancing pose. The dcfcnd::int :u·gucd that there was no common field of activity -
recording and dancing were different fields and that no damage had been suffered to justify an 
injunction. These w·gumcnts were rejected and the injunction was granted. The court held that the 
re did not need to be a common field or activity. 1hat it was enough that dcrcnclant had usccl the 
plaintiffs identity and reputation to sell his producls. Damage was recognised based on the 
recognition that a person's rcpu1a1ion or identity Ins a commercially high value (at 595 per Evatt 
CJ and Myers J. at 603 per Manning J). However since 1ha1 time the Australian Courts have 
instead stretched the action of passing off to cover appropriation or personality rather than moving 
to create a new tort. 
Section 9 provicles:··No person shci/1, in lrade, engage in conduct rhat is mi.1leacli11g or clereptii ·e or 
is likely to fllislead or cleceii •e"" 
Section 13(f) provides: "No person slwll, in tmde . in co1111C'Ctio11 ll'ith the supply or possible 
supply of goods or sen'ices or with the pro11w1io11 hy any 111e1111.1· of the su1>ply or use of goods or 
sen'ices - Falsely represent that goods or sen'ices l,111 ·e w,_,· sponsorship, a1>11rornl, endorsefllent, or 
affiliation ." 
A number of Australian cases under the corresponding s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 have 
recognised appropriation of personality. In IOrJ, Ca11tc11we Pty Lid v Sho:,lwna Pr_,, Lid ( 1988) 
ATPR 40-83 the court would not limit the application of ss 52 and 53 so as to exclude from their 
ambit those "appropriation·· cases where a party. withoul au1hority appropriates for commercial 
gain the reputation of ano1hcr person . II was fell 1ha1 1hc law should guard againsl consumers 
being mislead by a false rcprcsc111a1io11 as 10 an associa1io11 bc1wecn goods and services and a 
respected identity. Sec also lfoney v Au.1tralia11 Airline ( 1989)14 IPR 185. Oli1·if1 New/011-.foJ,11 
v Scho/1-PlougJ, (Australia) Ltd (1986) ATPR 40-697. INXS v S0111h Sea Buhhle Co Pty Lid 
(1986) ATPR 40-667. Nosroc Enterprises Pry Lid v Ne11· Conrepr tn111or1 Sen'ices Pry Lie/ 
(1981) ATPR 40-2]5 and I lutche11re v S0111h Sea Buhhle Com1Jc111_,, Lid ( 1986) 64 ALR 3]0 also 
considered the Australian equivalent to s 13: s 5](c). 
Sec Tolley v Fry ( 1931) AC 333 where a remedy was granted 10 an amateur golfer who was 
caricatured in an advertisement of the defendants chocolate. The excellence of the chocolate was 
likened to the excellence of the plaintiffs drive. The defendant alleged that the advertisement was 
libellous. It is relatively clear that there is nothing defamatory about someone liking a particulw· 
brand of chocolate. however. Tolley alleged a latent meaning which would injure his reputation as 
an amateur golfer. It would seem that lhc basis of the decision is 1hat a person who lives by their 
public im::igc have had something 1ake11 away from them an misappropriated. Fleming (above n 
59 at p576) suggests that Tolley v Fn has potentially far reaching implications and could be 
stretched as a basis for rcslraining the unauthorised use of anyone's name or picture for commercial 
purposes under the guise of protection or rcpulation. (citations omitted) However at first instance 
Greer J commented; "unless a man's pho10 caricaiurc or name is published in such a contexI that 
the publication can be said to be dcfarna1ory within 1hc law or libel ii cannot be made the subject 
matter of complaint by action at law. (I 1930] I KB 467) Such comment would appear to be a 
clear rejection of tortous liability for appropriation of personality unless the elements of 
defamation w·c also satisfied. 
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Pannam72 argued in the 1960's that it was open for Australian Courts to recognise the 
existence of a property right in each individual for the exploitation of identity. If the 
individual does not wish to use it, then this choice should be protected by the ability to 
resu·ain unauthorised appropriation and to recover damages. If the individual does so 
choose, the manner of exploitation should be within control. Clearly such a right should 
be protected, it is just whether under a separate tort or under stretched categories of 
existing actions. The recent moves in Australia seem to indicate the latter path of action is 
being followed, this is likely to occur in ew Zealand due to the wide interpretation taken 
of section 9 of the Fair Trading Act 1986. 
Again the is action is aimed at preventing someone from using your name as an object of 
economic value rather than asserting the right to be named. This is emphasised by the 
remedy of damages which is aimed at replacing what has been lost by the use of the name 
in the panicular context.73 
(e) Unfair competition 7..i 
Authors may prohibit the use of another's name in connection with the work under the 
tort of unfair competition. There is as yet no tort of unfair competition in ew Zealand, 
although the possibility of one developing should not be dismissed. 75 As Ricketson 76 
72 
73 
74 
75 
C Pannam "Unauthorised Use of Names or Photographs in Australia" ( 1966) 40 ALJ 4 at pp 12-
13. 
Above n 64 discussion in Atlions per Henry J. 
The common law doctrine of unfair competition developed in the United States as an effort to curb 
fraudulent and deceptive trade practices and 10 promote fair dealing in the market place. Cou11s use 
the doctrine lo prohibit a wide range off commercial practices including misappropriation. 
trademark infringement. false representation. false advertising and any other conduct which the 
court feels violates fair and honest conduct. Mc Canhy 'J'mdemar/..s and U11}<1ir Competition (2ed 
1984) ppl4-16. 
R Hammond ("The Law and Ideas" Legal Research Foundation No 30 ( I 989) p 18.) argues that 
New Zealand courts would 1101 recognise a separate tort or unfair competition. 1101 only because of 
the width of section 9 or the Fair Trading Act 1986 but clue 10 the emphatic rejec1ion of the High 
Court or Aus1ralia to unfair compc1i1ion as an independent lort in Moorgate 'J'ohacco Co v Phillip 
Morris (No 2) (( 1985) 59 ALJR 77). (Later in "The Legal Protection or Ideas" ( I 99 I) 29 Osgoode 
Hall LJ 94 at p I I 5 1164 Hammond comments that the issue has not been fully resolved in New 
Zealand.) Prior 10 this decision there had lx:en in existence a line of authority emanating from !he 
New South Wales courts suggesting that there was room in Australian jurisprudence for such a 
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comments, although there are protections availabl e for nearly all situations, under a 
number of different headings, th ere is not one comprehensive law to cover 
misappropriation of the intangible results of one's competitor 's skill and labour. 
To recover for unfair competition the author must have lost revenues, business reputation 
or have suffered other economic injury. In the United States both the common law action 
and section 43 (a) Lanham Act77 protect the ri ght to prevent fal se attribution of a work. 
Protection is available if a name is omitted and another is submitted. The essence of 
unfair competition in this context can best be illu strated by Smith v Montoro 78 where 
the court refused to dismiss a claim brought under the Lanham Act for the improper 
removal of an actor' s name and the substitution of another's name in film credits and 
advertising. The plaintiff successfull y argued that substitution of another 's name 
deprived him of benefits that follow from recogniti on as a peiformer.79 The director of a 
colourised film marketed as 'colouri sed by Turners Entertainment Co' could argue by 
analogy the loss of benefits from having their name omitted. However it is likely that the 
76 
77 
78 
79 
concept.(//e.wgv11 v ABC (( 1975) 7 ALR 233). In M oor golc Deane J slates that the rejec tion of 
unfair competition docs not mean a denial of the desirability of adopting a fl ex ible approach to 
traditional form s of action when such an approach is necessary to adapt them to meet new 
circumstances and situations This approach has been mentioned in New Zealand (M cB can ' s 
Orchids (Aus/) P1y Lid v M c Beans Orchids Lid ( 1982) I Z IPR 406) however it is submil!ed that 
New Zealand Courts should examine further the comment made by Lord Diplock in En'in Wa mink 
v Town cncl & Son [ I 979 I AC 73 1 at p743 that the increas ing recognition by Parliament of the 
need for more ri gourous standards of commercial honesty should be a fac tor considered by a judge 
S Ricketson "Reaping Without Sow ing; Unfair Competition and Intellec tual Propert y Ri ghts in 
Anglo Australian Law" ( 1984) UNSW L Rev I at p30. He lx: lievcs that the "sole requirement 
for protec tion should simpl y be th:1t th e plaintiff has ex pended tim e. skill and labour in the 
creation or some intangible bu siness value. Th e one precondition being that in so doing has 
obtained for him se lf an actual or potential advantage or has placed the plaintiff at an actual or 
potential disadvantage". 
A Cook " The Colouri sa tion of Blac k and White Film s: A n Example of the Lack o f Substantive 
Protection for A rti sts in the USA .. ( 1988) 63 otre Dame L: Rev 309 at p3 14. The Lanham Act 
section 43(a) 15 USC s l l 25(a) prov ides: "Any 11n.1011 ll'ho sho/1 ojjir, O/J/!I_I' , or 011110, or use i n 
co1111 cc1io11 wilh any goods or sen'ire, (I fol.1e de.1/TI/Jlio11 of ongin. or 011yfal.1c dcscrif) lio 11 or 
r eprcsc111a1io11 ... one/ sho/1 ca11.1c .\I/eh good., /0 c111er i1110 co11 1111effc' .. . ,hall he /l(J h/e 10 a ci ,·i l 
ac1io11 hy m1y 11aso11 ... 1\'lw hc/1ne.1 tlwl he 1.1 or 1.1 likelr 10 he do11wged hy 1/, e 11 .1e of 011y such 
false dcscrip1io11 or n '11rcse11101io11" . S111 i1h v Mo111oro 648 F 2d 602 at 605 (9 th Cir I 98 1 ). A 
film distributor removed an actors name from credit s and .idvcrti sing material was held actionable 
under the Lanham Act. Ya111c1a Co v Co11i10/ Rernrds In c 279 F Supp 582 (SDNY) 586-7 
reversed on other grounds 393 F 2cl 9 1 (2d C ir I %8) where use of the plaintiffs name in such a 
way as to overstate hi s contribution to the record was actionable. 
648 F 2d 602 (9th Cir 198 1). 
Above n 78 at p603. 
LAW LIBRA9Y 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF v\LLL1 .. GTOl't 
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director's name will appear somewhere on the film credits and if not still in the industry it 
is difficult to see what economic loss could be attributed to the advertising method. 
Unfair Competition does not provide a right to have a name associated with a work, a 
successful action is dependent upon economic loss, and this is not a requirement of 
a.iticle 6bis. 
(f) Passing off 
An action for traditional passing off80 would arise 111 the situation where a 
publisher/production company publishes the work of an unknown author/director 'A' 
under the name of a well known author/director 'B'. A passing off suit would be 
brought by 'B'. 
Well known authors can prevent their names from being used on works not executed by 
them. In Archibald v Sweet ' A' the author of a law book sold the copyright to 'B '. 
'B' subsequently published a third edition of the work which was edited by a third party. 
A number of errors were contained in the edition. There is an analogy with the director 
of a colourised film. Lord Tenterden CJ commented in Archibald v Sweet : 
The class of cases most like the present arc those of the perfumers and fish sauce makers. where 
one has sold an article made by himself. professing that it was of the manufacture of the plaintiff. 
The first case of its kind was that of a perfumer. There. the injury was the detcrioating credit of 
the plaintiff's commodity; and here. it is the injury 10 the reputation of the author.8 1 
This action does not provide a right to claim authorship. It provides a remedy in the 
situation where there has been economic loss due to false application of a name in an 
incorrect context. 
80 
81 
Sec En•in Wamink above n 75 at 742. Lord Dipl<x.:k·s requirements for the action: 
(l)A misrepresentation: 
(2)Made by a trader in the course of trade: 
(3)To prospective customers or ultimate consumcrs: 
(4)Which is calculated to injure the busincss or goodwill of anothcr trader (in the sense that this is 
a reasonably forsccablc consequence): 
(S)Which causes actual damage to a busincss or goodwill of a trader by whom the action is 
brought or will probably do so. 
(1832) 5 C & P 219: 172 ER 947 at p9-i9. 
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(g) Fair Trading Act 1986 
There has been in New Zealand a marked reluctance to read down the words of section 9 
of the Act. 82 The trend with the similar Australian provision, section 52 of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974, is that it is be ing applied in an ever widening range of 
circumstances. Section 9 provides protection analogis to that provided under passing 
off. 
There have been no cases under section 9 in Ne w Zealand re levant to this area, however 
there have been some in Australia. 83 In Crocker v Papunya ,8-i which is the most 
illustrative case in the context of the right of paternity , the plaintiff argued that the 
description of him as the editor of the work on the frontispiece of the catalogue was 
conduct proscribed by section 52(1) . Here a second catalogue was produced out of a 
first whi_ch was created by the plaintiff. The title of the second work was altered and the 
introduction to the work was removed . It was found that due to the close 
coITespondence between the contents of the two catalogues, the second could properly be 
described as the second edition of its predecessor. 85 The omission of the introduction 
was not of such significance as to make it misleading or deceptive to describe the plaintiff 
as the editor of the work . The court held that just because he was accredited as editor it 
did not mean that he was responsible for all of the contents, drawing an analogy with a 
newspaper editor. 86 ft is arguable by analogy the same argument will apply to a director, 
due to the well known practice of editing films and that the colourisation of a film, 
complete with the director's name is not conduct proscribed by section 9 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
Taylor Brothers Ltd v 'fa y/ors Textile Sen"ice.1 (Aud) Ltd ( 1988) 2 ZLR I al p39. 
Note above discuss ion on appropriation or personality in the contex t of s 52 or the Trade Practi ces 
Act. 
Above n 48 . 
Above 11 48 at 46-7 19. 
Above n 48 at p46-720. 
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The Court in Crocker suggested that a note 'based on previous work' would have been 
approp1iate, to clear up any confusion.87 In this context United States courts have held 
that such a note does not indicate that the author contributed to the work in question. 88 
This raises the interesting issue, that, if at the beginning of the film there was a legend 
disassociating the director with the film and noting the criticism expressed, then 
depending on its ability to be seen and understood it may be acceptable and avoid a 
section 9 action. 89 Disclaimers may avoid a cause of action and satisfy notions of fair 
trading yet do little to provide protection for creator's rights especially in the context of 
the right of integrity.90 
In the situation where another's name is placed on the work and the author claims under 
section 9, there is a possibility under section 42 of the Act, that upon application by the 
Commerce Commission the court may make an order to disclose certain information or 
publish a particular advertisement. This is the closest the economic torts come to 
establishing a right to claim authorship. 
Section 9 has a number of benefits over the other actions previously discussed, the 
author does not need to have an established reputation, there is no requirement of the 
same field of trading activity, the representation does not have to be made to potential 
customers, nor does damage need to be reasonably foreseeable. Despite all of these 
factors section 9 does not aid an author in a claim to have their name associated with the 
work in accordance with article 6bis. 
87 
88 
89 
90 
Above n 48 at p 46-720. 
Ccisal v Poy111c1· Products Inc 295 F Supp 33 I J53 (SDNY 1968). 
Above n 52 at paras 3.49 and 7 .21 
Sec Landau above n 35 at p25 I citing ll11s1011 pl5 The court m,1uired the following legend to be 
a11ached to the film: "In respect for the memory of John Huston. screen play writer ancl director of 
this film made in 1950 in bl:.lck and white. his heirs oppose the projection in France or this 
colourised version created in I 986" The court also required that viewers be instructed that they hacl 
the ability not to watch the film in colour by using the colour control knob on all televisions. 
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2. Protection of the right of integrity - methods of compliance 
(a)Contract 
The law of contract may provide a measure of protection to the right of integrity. 
Arrangements would need to be made between the author of the work and the purchaser 
of the work as to permissible alterations. Under the classical doctrine, creator's-rights 
are personal, and not proprietary rights, if the right to restrain alterations that injure the 
author's reputation are waived, the waiver may be ineffectual and illegal. This would 
appear to be the situation under article 6bis. 
Contracts between authors and publishers and author's and employees often reserve 
rights in the latter to make alterations to the work. lllustrative is the following clause: 
Subject to Employee's right to make the Director's cut. Employer shall have the sole and 
exclusive right to determine the final cut of all versions of the photoplay without any restriction 
whatsoever. 91 
Such clauses are arguably inconsistent with Berne, yet, in the absence of guidance as to 
the status of creator's-rights, courts in ew Zealand will be placed in a difficulty when 
faced with a challenge to one of these clauses.92 Once given recognition the traditional 
doctrines of undue influence, unconscionability and restraint of trade gather more 
meaning.93 
Until such time it is relevant to consider whether the director is the copyright owner and 
whether there has been an assignment or a licence of the rights. Where no te1111 regarding 
alterations has been expressly bargained for, as in the case of a right to colourise the film, 
91 M Silfen Counselling Client.I in the Entertainment Industry /980 (Practising Law Institute, New 
York.1982) Yo! I at p687. 
92 Above n 17 at p773. 
93 Yet as Yaver comments above note 17 at p778 th~ll the result of restraint of trade is an 
unenforceable de futuro contract instead of void ah initio. If the copyright has been transferred the 
copyright can continue to be held unless the contract as a whole can be shown that it should be 
rescinded for unconscionability. Sec for example O'Sul/i\'(/n v Management Agency & Music Lid 
[1984] 3 WLR 448.456. The problem is that often the defendant lo such a suit has a deeper 
pocket than the author and can afford to appeal continuously. 
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it is relevant to consider whether there has been an assignment or licensing of the rights 
in the work. An assignee is the full owner of the right assigned and may deal with the 
work as absolute owner, whereas a licence is often a personal right which cannot be 
transferred and furthermore a licensee may not always be entitled to make alterations to 
the work94 In the absence of any express or implied prohibition a licensee has the right 
to make alterations but not of a substantial nature. 95 It would appear that there is a right 
to make alterations as long as the reputation of the author is not injured.96 
There are two major problems with reliance on contract. The first is where there is no 
contractual limitation copyright owners may do as they like with a particular work. This 
may include the painting of spots on works of art to match the decor in a home, the 
removal of a tail on a painting of a circus horse and the alteration of fine line sketches into 
garishly coloured jig saw puzzles complete with the author's name and the stamp made in 
Korea.9 7 The second problem occurs when the copyright expires, although the 
contracting palties are still bound, the third party is not, and could alter the work 111 any 
way. 
Much of the protection contract offers the author is dependent upon the author owning 
the copyright in the work. If the author does, by appropriate contractual stipulation it is 
possible to control the use made of the work.98 The rights in article 6bis are independent 
of economic rights and are not therefore adequately protected by contract. 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
Frisby v British Bruadcosting Corporation above n 25. it is however difficult to ex tract gu idance 
from the cases. Messanger v Briti.1 h Bmculrnsting Co1porntio11 Lid 119291 AC 151. Loew ·s v 
Liffle [1958] 1 Ch 650 er Re Cli11ical 0/Jstetrics I 1905- 101 MCC 176. S0/1/fJSOII Low & Co v 
Duckworths 11923-28! MCC 204. 
Frisby (above n 25) Sec also .lo.1e11h (,1bovc n 25) where the plaintiff was an ex pert on jade who 
wrote an article for The Co1111oi.1.1e1ir . The editor sen t the article to a freelance journalist to 
improve on the style. The plaintiff objec ted to the new edi ti on on the ground that it contained 
many errors of fact and the altered title and text detracted from the theme and he refused to allow 
the article to appear either with or without hi s name attached. The plaintiff was not bound to 
submit to having his name publi shed as the author of a different style and his refusal did not 
amount to a repudiation of the contract. 
Above n 81. 
Examples from Australian Council paper on Moral Rights and the Ans (Sydney. 1984) pi. 
Above n 4 7 at p 429 para 15.74. 
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(b)The Copyright Act 1962 
The question can be raised will a distortion, mutilation or other derogatory treatment of 
the work be an infringement of copyright? The answer can be illustrated using the film 
colourisation. Initially it is relevant to decide what copyright category a particular film 
falls, that is; cinematographic film s, artistic or dramatic works, in order to determine 
what acts constitute infringement and who is the copyright owner. 
(i) Cinematographic films 
If the film is a cinematographic film under the Copyright Act 1962 the maker of the film 
is the copyright owner and by definition is unlike ly to include the director, despite bei ng 
an author of the film. 99 The relevant provi sions are section s 14(4) 100 and (8) 10 1. Section 
14(8) refers to the maker as being the person by whom all of the arrangements have been 
made. This is a role which traditionally falls to the producer. Section 14(4) serves to 
vest copyright in the employer of a pe rson e mplo yed unde r a contact of service or 
apprenticeship, this will vest copyright in the production studio unl ess there is an 
agreement to the contrary 102 . 
99 
100 
101 
102 
It is unclear even under Berne who is the author or a cinematographic work . A n iclc 15( I ) provides 
"In order that the authors of works protected by the present convention sha ll. 111 the absence of 
proof to the contr:u-y. be cons idered as such. and be consequentl y admi tt ed 10 institute proceedings 
against pirates before the courts or the vari ous countries of the Union. it will be suffic ient that 
their names be indicated on the work in the according manner." On its face art 15 ( I ) would 
include as authors the director. producer. screen maker and anyone else who appew·s as the maker of 
the film .In France the ri ghts of the director arc defined in A rt 14 para 2 of the Act o f 11 March 
1957 (as amended by the 1985 Act) as the co au thor of the ritm. A Bertrand " Internati onal 
Copyright: Will Droil M or:11 Seem A mora l in the USA. 119891 7 EIPR 247 .250. 
Section 14(4) provides: .\1/hject 10 the 11m1·isio11s of 1/11.1 Ac/, the 1110/.:cr of o ci11e11101ogro11h jll111 
shall be e111i1lecl 10 w1_\' coprright s11bsis1i11g in the jil111 h_,. l'il'l11c of this .\ff/ion : 
Pro1 ·ided 1h0111'11ere o person co111111i.1sio11s 1/1c 11/(/U11g of'ajil1111111cl poy.1 or ugrces to pa_,·Ji>r ii in 
money or money's wol'lli , 1111cl the jil111 i.1 nwdc 11111·s11c1111 of" 1h01 co1111111.1sio11, llwl person, in 1he 
absence of any agree111c111 10 the contmn, .111(/11, .. he entitled to ony 1·011rrigh1 .\llhsi.1ti11g in the 
jil111 hy 1·ir111e of this section . 
Section 14(8) provides: For the p11r110.1c•.1 of' 1/11.1 Act tlll' 1111,kl'/' of' o ci11c11wtogra11h jil111 is the 
perJ 0/1 by \\'/1()11/ //,e W'J'Clllgl'llll'III.\ lll'Cl'S.\(tr\'fiJr lll!lking tliefillll OU' llllc/l'rt!lken 
H Laddie. Prescott P. Vitoria M n,e Modem Loll' of Co11,.,.ig/11 ( Bullcrworths. London. 1980) al 
para7 . l l p274. com ments that many directors were not under con tracts of serv ice but under 
contracts for service (the distin ction discussed al 6. I 3 cl seq) so that copyri ght clid not pass 
automatically to the production compan y by whom they were en gaged. Much will depend on the 
construction of the contract. 
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Only by contractual specification will copyright be held by the director. The infringing 
acts in respect to a cinematograph fi Im are specified in section 14(5). 103 The colourisation 
of the film involves the following copyright steps: A copy of the film is made, the frames 
are then coloured by the use of a computer programme. Colour is inserted through the 
person or the computer programme running itself and applying chromience and colour 
directly to the work and producing the resulting cinernatograph film.lo.+ This action 
involves the making of a copy of the film which is specified as an infringing act under 
section 14(5)(a). 
(ii) Artistic works 
If protection is claimed under photographs by virtue of the Copyright Act 1913 the 
copyright owner is provided by section 8(a) of that Act: 
Where in the case or an ... photograph. the ... original was ordered by some other person. and was 
made pursuant to valuable consideration in pursuance or that order. then in absence or any 
agreement to the contrary. the person by whom the plate or other original was ordered shall be the 
first owner of the copyright. 
In other cases section 27 provides: 
... [T]he making of the original negatives from which the photograph was directly or indirectly 
derived: and the person who was the owner or such negative at the time when such negative was 
made shall be deemed to be the author of the work .... 
These provisions effectively ensure that the production company is the owner of the 
copyright in films. 
I 03 Section 14(5) provides:The acts restricted hr the CO/Jl"l"ight in II cinc111111ogrnphfi/111 are-
(a)Making a copy of the ji/111: 
(h)Causing the }1/111, in so for as it consi.11s of ri .1 1111/ i11111gc.1, to he .1ec'n in puhlic, or in so /cir as 
it consists of sounds, to he heard in puhlic: 
(c) Brvadcosting the fi/111 : 
(d) Cousin& theji/11110 be trnnsmilled to .\1/hsrrihcrs to a clijji1sion .1e1Tice. 
104 R Drurie "Colourisation or Films" ( 1988) 10 EIPR 37 at p 39. 
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By virtue of clause 16 of the First Schedule of the Copyright Act 1962 section 7(4) 
describes the acts restricted by copyright in an artistic work which is a photograph .
105 
The colourisation of a film would be an infringement of copyright under section 7(4)(a) 
as a reproduction 106 of the work in a material form. 
(iii) Dramatic works 
There appears to be no definition under the Copyright Act 1913 of who is the author of a 
film treated as a dramatic work. It is arguable that as a director is almost always 
responsible for the way a film is shot, and would therefore be providing the film with an 
original character, that the director is the author of the film. 107 In such a case the director 
would be the first copyright owner unless the film was made in the course of 
employment. 
Would colourisation be an infringement if the film was claiming protection as a dramatic 
work? The provisions of the Copyright Act 1962 have effect in relation to the film as if it 
had been an original dramatic work within the meaning of the 1962 Act. 
108 
The infringing acts are substantially similar to those in relation to artistic works and are 
specified in section 7(3) . I09 Again the work would be an infringement as a reproduction 
I 05 Section 7(4) provides: T!,e acts restricted hy tl,e rn11yrigl,t in <Ill artistic ll'ork are -
(a) Reprod11ri11g tl,e work i11 any nwtcual jor111 · 
106 
107 
108 
109 
(h)?11blishi11g the work : 
(r)l11r!ucli11g tl,e ll'ork in a 1e/e1'i.1io11 hmll(/rn.11 · 
(c/)Ca11si11g a progrn111111e 11 •!,ic!, i11c/11de.1 the 11 ·ort. IO be 1rw1s111i11ed to .rnhscriher.1 IO a dijji1sio11 
ser1·1ce. 
Above n 52 and accompanying tex t for the definition or reproduc tion . 
It is also arguable that the script writer con tributes just as much charac ter and thus the possibility 
of joint authors ' '. -; arises. 
Clause 15. First Schedule Copyright Act 1962. 
Section 7(3) provides: The acts u•stricted hy the CO/Jyright in u liternry, drn111a1ic or 11111sical work 
are-
(a)Reprod11ci11g tl,e 11 ·ork i11 any 11wteriuljim11 : 
(h)Publishi11g tl,e ll'ork: 
(c)Pe1forn1i11g 1!,e ll'ork in puhlic.· 
(d)Broadcasti11g 1!,e 11 ·ork: 
(e) Causing tl,e \\'Ork to he 1rw1.1111i11ed IO ~11h.11'f'iha.1 IO a di/j11.1w11 se/'\'1ce: 
(f) Making any adapt ion of tl,e \\'Ork: 
32 
in any material form. In both cases of artistic works and dramatic works the film is likely 
to be shown to the public by the colourisers and will infringe copyright more than once. 
The provisions of the Act regarding copyright infringement do not protect the author's 
right of integrity as required by article 6bis. All actions of infringement must be brought 
by the copyright owner, thus any protection obtained is dependent upon the ownership of 
economic rights while under Berne the rights are clearly independent. 1 IO 
There is also a possibility of obtaining copyright in the distorted or mutilated work. 
Although Berne does not prevent such, it does seem to be a breach of the policy behind 
creator's-rights and article 6bis to allow copyright protection of such a work.
111 The 
situation may of course be different where the author allows or of approves of the work. 
This scenario is unlikely to exist as it is a matter for the copyright owner to decide 
whether to contest the new work as an infringement of their copyright and the author's 
opinion will generally be of little influence. 
(c)Defamation 
An action for defamation is available to protect the right of integrity. This is because an 
action for defamation protects the person from that which impairs reputation in the 
community. This could arise when the work is published or displayed publicly and the 
author believes that their integrity has been affected. 
(g) Doing, in relation to <111 cuhi11tio11 of tlie work, any of tlie act.1 s11c•cij1ccl in relation to tlic work 
in parngraplis (o) to (c) oft/us s11h.1e1·1ion . 
l JO It is interesting to note that the Australian Copyright Act 1968 s 35(5) provides that where an 
author of certain types of works may veto the use or the work for a purpose different from that 
original;y contemplated. and s 55(2) the compulsory recording licence in respect of adaptions of 
musical works docs not apply in respect of an adapt ion which debases the work. 
111 In the United States copyright protection has been given 10 the co lourised versions or black and 
white films since J unc 22 1987. 52 Fed Reg 23 443 - 23446 ( 1987). Sec the discussion in M 
Landau above n 35. for an United Kin gdom view sec R Druric above n I 03. 
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In Archibala v Sweet 112 where 'A"s copyright in a work was sold to 'B' and 'B' 
published a third edition of the work which was edited by another but not said to be so 
which publishers would suppose to be the work of 'A'. ·A' had a reputation and the 
errors contained in the third edition were such as to detract from that reputation.
11 3 Also 
illustrative is Lee v Gibbings' 14 where a book was published as a smaller second edition 
and the cou1t accepted that such could detract from the authors reputation as a scholar and 
author. Cornish comments: 
Defamation. however concerns personal reputation and there ma y be matters or artistic or 
professional integrity which it would be difficult to persuade a court went to personal reputation. 
The record or common law defamation shows the occasional case where an author has succeeded in 
defamation against another who has made incursions and adapt ions which can be said to cheapen 
the author's personal reputation . But it can never be easy to succeed in liti ga tion of this type.
115 
However, when one considers the comment made by Fleming who rejects the standard 
of the 'right thinking person' in favour of the standard of ·a substantial and reasonable 
group in the community',' 16 which could easily be an artistic group, the concerns 
expressed by Cornish pale. 
Damages for defamation are usually compensatory, hurt to feelings is compensated as 
well as damage to reputation in the strict sense. 117 However, it must be noted that the 
difficulty of drawing a line between what should and should not be tolerated by an author 
is a difficult line to draw and opinions may not coincide. 118 Although protection of the 
autho1~ work, honour and integrity is a by product of an action which seeks to protect 
the authors public image from harm the action for defamation does provide some 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
Above n 81. 
Above n 81 at p 950. 
( 1892) 67 LT 263 (Ch D). 
W Cornish "Moral Rights Under the 1988 Act" ( 1989) .12 EIPR 449 at p-l50. 
Above n 59 at p503. 
Fie/cling v \'ari<'I_,. ln corpor111ecl [ 19671 2 QB 841 (CA). S11111!, v John F1111J11.r & Sons Pty Lid 
(1987) 86 FLR 843. Urren v.lohn F11i1f11.r & Sons P1y Lid ( 1966) I 17 CLR 118. 151 per 
Windeyer J. 
Fleming above n 59 at p573. 
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protection for the right of integrity as expressed in article 6bis. However, an action for 
defamation will be of little use if the author of the work altered is unidentified . 
(d)False fight pril'Gc_V 119 
False light privacy protects the plaintiff from another party 's presentation of a work that 
would reflect badly on the plaintiff or injure the plaintiffs reputation.
120 Although 
originating in English jurisprudence when Lord Byron succeeded in preventing the 
circulation of a bad poem which had been attributed him, the action has not been really 
recognised since then in Commonwealth jurisprudence.
121 The false light need not be a 
defamatory light, 122 however it often is, which perhaps explains why BurrowsI 23 argues 
that such is not about privacy at all, and is purely about protection of reputation and will 
in New Zealand almost always be covered by the tort of defamation. False light privacy, 
however, protects the individuals right to be free from mental distress caused by 
misleading public exposure. The plaintiff must show that the false representation was 
highly offensive to the reasonable person and that the defendant acted knowingly, or with 
reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publication.
12-l The standard is so much higher 
than that of article 6bis which requires only that it be prejudicial to honour and reputation . 
It has also been suggested that those who seek publicity may waive their publicity claims 
which will remove protection for those well known authors. 
125T his would appear to be 
the correct view when one considers the lack of reliance placed on the right in the United 
States in recent years. 126 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
Above 11 61. 
Sec generally H Wade .. Defamation and tlH.: Right of Privacy .. ( 1%2) 15 Vand Law Rev 1093. 
Note ( 1962) 50 Cal L Rev 357. 
Lord Byron v .loh11s1011 1816 2 Mcr 29. s5 ER 851. P Keeton above n 66 at p 864. 
Zolich .. Laudatory invasion of Privacy .. I 967 Clev M:u·sh L Rev 540. 
Above n 66 at p756. 
Wagner alxlve n 65 at pp669-673. 
Keeton above 11 66 at p867. 
Sec D Zimmerman "False Light Invasion or Privacy: The Light that Failed" ( 1989) 64 NYULR 
364. 
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(e)Unfair competition 
If recognised as a tort in New Zealand, a cause of action under unfair competition for 
protection of the right of integrity may arise in the situation where a licensee of the work 
changes the work to such an extent that an attribution to the author would deceive the 
public and put the author at an unfair economic disadvantage. 127 
Gillian v American Broadcasting Co 128 is the most often cited American case in this 
context. In this case Monty Python sought an injunction to prevent ABC from showing 
an edited version of their show. Monty Python argued that the "editing done by ABC 
mutilated the original work and that consequently the broadcasting of those programs as 
the creation of Monty Python violated the Lanham Act..." 
129 The court granted the 
injunction thus preventing future broadcasts. The court found that the edited version 
omitted essential elements of the story line and "impaired the integrity of appellants work 
and represented to the public as the production of the appellants what was actually a mere 
caricature of their talents." 130 
Following the line of Gillian there is scope for the development of unfair competition 
however it is restricted as a plaintiff must establish economic injury. This is because the 
action is based on a right to exploit one's own property right, which once transferred, is 
lost, and with it the right to make a claim for unfair competition . 
131 The action suffers 
from restrictions that article 6bis does not impose and is not an action that is personal to 
the author independent of ownership. 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
Cook above n 77 at p3 I 9. 
538 F 2d 14 (2d Cir 1976). 
Above n 128 at p 24. 
Above n 128 at p25. 
Cook above n 78 at p 320. 
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(f)Passi11g off 
Where a lesser work is passed off as the work of the author an action for passing off may 
lie. This action is dependent upon the author meeting the requirements of the action 
specified in Ervi11 Wami11k. 132 In the context of the right of integrity an author may well 
be offended by alterations to a work which may occasion no economic loss. In some 
cases the alterations may increase the sa les of the work, colourisation is a good example 
of bringing almost forgotten works back into the public eye. The requirement of 
economic loss make passing off an unsuitable cause of action in the context of the right 
of integrity. 
(g)Fair Tradi11g Act 1986 
For a successful action the author would have to show that the alterations to the work 
were such as to make it misleading or deceptive to the pub! ic for the author's name to be 
associated with the work. The problems the author faces in this context are well 
illustrated by Crocker 133 and indicate that in claiming protection for the right of integrity 
section 9 is not the appropriate action, as alterations which may offend an author's 
sensibilities may not be alterations which makes it false and misleading to have the 
author's name associated with the work. 
3. Summa1y of the methods of' complionce 
The above discussion indicates that New Zealand authors do not have a right to claim 
authorship as required by paragraph ( I ) of article 6bis. An action for defamation 
brought by an author may satisfy the right of integrity. The major problem with relying 
on actions such as passing off, unfair competition and the Fair Trading Act is that they 
are all economically orientated, whereas although creator's ri ghts have an economic 
perspective they cannot be adequately enforced by these causes of action. Contract, of 
132 Above n 80. 
133 Above n 48. sec above n 68 and 69 for a considcra1io11 of scc 1io11 13(1) which faces similw· 
difficulties to !hose under section 9. 
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itself does not provide protection unless the author has sufficient bargaining power, 
while the Copyright Act focuses predominantly on the rights of the copyright owner. A 
claim that these causes of action adequately protect the rights of paternity and integrity as 
required by article 6bis does not appreciate the nature of these rights and is completely 
inaccurate. 
New Zealand is in clear breach of the obligations imposed by article 6bis. The fact that 
Canada after acceding to the 1928 Rome revision enacted specific creator's-rights 
legislation, the recent moves by the United Kingdom in enacting specific creator's-rights 
legislation after years of asserting that their common law provided adequate protection, 
and the fact that the recent "Report on Moral Rights" by the Australian Copyright Council 
which rejects the need for Australia to reform its law, claiming its common law protection 
is adequate, has come under substantial criticisrnlJ-t adds credibility to the claim that New 
Zealand is in breach of its obligations under article 6bis. 
D. The Consequences of Non Compliance 
The 1928 Rome Revision contains no sanctions for the non compliance of any member 
counu·y.135 There are however two possible consequences at an international level. 136 
Firstly, New Zealand could be coerced into compliance under customary international 
law, due to a fundamental breach of a treaty obligation. 1:n This is unlikely as it has 
occurred in no other instance. Secondly, through diplomatic or trade pressure, which 
although unlikely at present, due to the lack of trade or economic incentives could change 
due to the agreement in April 1989 by members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 138 (GATT) that further negotiations would include trade related aspects of 
134 "'Report on Moral Right s" (Australian Government Printing Service. Canberra. I 988). Ricketson 
above n 31. Vavcr alxJvc 11 11 . 
135 ote however art 33 of the 1971 Paris revision (introduced at 1968 Stockholm Revision) which 
provides for the reference of disputes concerning the interpret:llion to be referred to the International 
Court of Justice. ye t there arc no procedures for enforcemen t or the judgement of the court. 
136 Ricketson above 11 31 at p482. 
137 Vienna Convention on Treaties 1960 art 60(2) and (3). 
138 October 30 1947. 61 TIAS No 17000 5.'i UNTS 187. 
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intellectual property (TRIPS) by December 1990. The implications for ew Zealand is 
that a GATT reso lution on TRIPS would require ew Zealand compliance. Current 
suggestions indicate that the latest rev ision of the Berne Convention the 1971 Paris 
Revision , is the appropriate international copyright standard. 139 ew Zealand with its 
current interest in GATT will not want to be viewed as lagging in its treaty obligations 
and could improve its standing by acceding to the 197 I Paris Revision and complying 
with the obligations that it places on member countries. 
III THE CURRENT ARTICLE 6BIS 
The status of creator's-rights has been reaffirmed at subsequent revisions 140 of the Berne 
Convention to which New Zealand was not a party, unlike Australia, the United 
Kingdom, Japan and the United States to cite a few. The most recent revision conference 
was in 1971 at Paris. Article 6bis now reads: 
(!)Independently of lhe aulhors economic righls. and even afler IIH.: transfer of the s:iid ri gh1 s. lhe author 
shall have the right to claim aulhorship of lhe work and to object to any distortion. mutilation or other 
modification of. or other derogatory art ion in relation 10, the sa id work. which would be prejudicial to 
his honour or reputation. 
(2)The rights grantee/ to the (111/hor in (/Crnrclance wit/1 the 1m•ccding 11aragrael1 .1/wll, ajier his death he 
maintained, at least until the expiry of the ern110111ic right.1 , and .1/wll he e.rercisahle hy the /Jer.1011 .1 or 
institutions authorised hy the legislation of the rnuntry ll'l1ere proter1io11 is claimed. lloll'e1·er, tlwse 
countries whose legislation , at the 111011,enl of their ratijitatio11 of or acces.1io11 10 thi .1 Act, cloe.1 1101 
prm'iclefor the protection ajier the death o{ the author of all the rights .1et 0111 in the /Jreceding paragra11h 
may /JrO\'ide that so111e of these rights 11w1·, ajier his death, cease 10 he 11w1111ai11ed. 
(3)The means of redress for safeguarding the ri ghts granted by this article shall be governed by the 
legislation of the coun1ry where pro1cc1ion is claim ed (emphasis added 10 allerations). 
A. The Changes to Article 6/Jis. 
The addition of "or other derogatory action" widens the scope of the right of integrity to 
include the way in which works are presented to the world and would therefore include 
an inaccurate retrospective exhibition of an artist's work and rhe publishing of a book in 
an offensive cover. 
139 Sec Mall .. The Inclusion of Trade Relalcd In1cl lee1ual Property Code Under 1he General Agreement 
of Trade and Tariffs" ( 1990) 30 Santa Clar;, L Rev 265. 267 
140 Brussels . Stockholm. 
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The minimum period for the protection of the rights has been extended to the term of 
copyright protection mandated by the Convention. I..\! Paragraph (2) is of some flexibility 
and allows a country to protect only one of the rights in paragraph (I). By not specifying 
who should maintain the rights for the period, article 6bis allows a country after the death 
of the author to refer protection of the rights to a specified body. 
The contents of article 6bis have been reaffirmed and expanded. Creator's-rights are 
firmly a part of the Berne Convention. Clearly New Zealand law does not presently 
comply with the new article 6bis. 
B. Should New Zealand Accede to the 1971 Paris Re1•isio11 (l the Berne Co111•e11tio11?. 
This question has wide implications for the whole of New Zealand's copyright law, 
however with the importance of the role of TRIPS in GA TT and when one considers that 
reform of intellectual property law and more specifically copyright law has been mooted 
in New Zealand it may be the appropriate time for ew Zealand accession to the 1971 
Paris revision. 
In 1985 the Law Refo1111 Division of the Department of Justice released a discussion 
paper "Refon11 of the Copyright Act 1962". Unfortunately only brief mention was made 
of Berne and a still briefer mention of creator's-rights. In 1989 a further paper was 
released by the Department, "The Copyright Act 1962; Options for Reform" and again 
there was little mention of Berne and the topic of creator's-rights was classed as a 
subsidiary matter. However it was recognised that any reforms would have to have 
regard to New Zealand's international obligations. When one adds to this recognition 
New Zealand's current interest in GATT the possibility of accession and compliance is 
much stronger. 
141 Article 7( I) which provides for a Icrm of life and fifl y years. 
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C. Paris Article 6bis: A Minimalist Approach or Compre/Je11si1•e Reform? 
The additions to article 6bis require alterations to New Zealand's domestic law to protect 
creator's rights. For minimum compliance ew Zealand could enact a right to claim 
authorship for the term of copyright. This is more probable than the extension of the 
action of defamation after death , as despite support for allowing an action to be brought 
by close relatives in certain circumstances and recommendations for such , they are not 
given effect to in the Defamation Bill 1988. 
Independent of New Zealand 's accession to the 1971 Paris Revision it is the author's 
opinion that New Zealand should examine the policy rationale behind the doctrine and 
enact creator's-rights legislation as required under the 1928 Rome Revision , in support 
of the number of New Zealand authors, who at this time are unprotected . There needs to 
be recognition that these rights exist for something a little more than the ethereal, and that 
they have an important role to play in the functioning of the creative market. l42 Once 
enacted creator's-rights will lose their uncertain status and have automatic standing in the 
eyes of the judiciary and public at large. 
l. Creator's-rights legis!Cttion 
There are a number of models available for New Zealand to follow and a number of 
different interests to consider. 1-11 Yet as Cornish acknowledges " ... in Continental 
Europe, moral rights did not emerge in their full glory in a single triumphant burst. They 
were the product of an evolution ... " 144 There are however some areas of importance 
which must be addressed. 
142 
143 
144 
Sec previous discuss ion in text accompanying 11 11- I 8. 
Canadian Copyright Act.sec for comrncntary;Vavcr above 11 17 anti R Gibbens "The Moral Rights 
of Artists anti the Copyright Act Amendment"' ( 1989) 15 Can Bus LJ 441. The United Kingdom 
Copyright. Designs and Patents Act 1988. sec W Cornish above 11 115. S Glass "Moral Rights 
and the New Copyright Law .. ( I 990) 34 SJ 6 .. Californian Art Preservation Act 1985, Artists 
Authorship Rights Act 1983 ( cw York). Massachusctls Moral Rights Statute 1985.E Damish 
'The New York Artist's Au1horship Rights Ac1: A Compara1i vc Cri1i4uc" ( 1984) 84 Col L Rev 
1733. 
Cornish above n 115 al p452. 
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(a) Protection of whom? 
Authors of all works accorded copyright protection should be accorded creator's-rights. 
This will involve a redefinition of who is an author of a work with a focus on the creative 
input into a work. Authorship should not be lost through an employment contract. 
In the case of joint authors guidance can be obtained from the French Copyright Act 
1957, where, in article 14 a director is deemed to be a co author of a film along with the 
script writer, the author of the adaption and the author of the dialogue. 145 All authors 
should have the right to claim authorship and to prevent their integrity from being 
harmed. 
(b) Duration ofprotection 
The rights specified in article 6bis are personal to the author and should upon death 
become the responsibility of a public body to ensure the preservation of the work and 
protection of the author's rights. This provides the dual function of protecting the public 
interest in the preservation of cultural heritage. There already exists in New Zealand a 
substantial number of bodies whose statutory purpose is to preserve creative works. 146 
These bodies should be specifically recognised under creator's-rights legislation and a 
number of standards regarding the preservation of the work and protection of the 
creator's-rights imposed. 
145 Above n 99 Bertrand A at p250. Further art 10 or the Act provides that in the case of 
disagreement between the authors the court will settle the dispute. 
146 The New Zealand Film Archives. a charitable trust established in 1985 which is a member or the 
FIAF (Federation Internationale des Archives du Film)acquires and preserves film to ensure public 
availability. The National Art Gallery. Museum and War Memorial Act 1972 s 11 ( I )(b) lists as a 
function to act as the national repository for. and display of a large range of visual arts. The 
National Library Act I 965 imposes the function by s6( I )(a) to developed and maintain a national 
collection of library material relevant to cw Zealand and its people. library material includes: 
books. films. paintings. etchings and photos. The Queen Eli1.abeth the Second Arts Council of 
New Zealand Act l 974 gives power to the Council (s I 0(~)(1))) to acquire. accept. any artwork and 
to deliver it for safekeeping to a number of specified bodies. The Antiquities Act l 975 is aimed at 
the protection of antiquities by controlling the method of sale and disposition. 
42 
(c) Scope of works protected 
There are of course some works which attract copyright protection which are arguably 
not worthy of long term preservation, these include office memoranda, phone books and 
street directories. The preservation of these works could depend on the intention of the 
author as to the pe1manence of the work, and, in the case of works such as office memo 
could be dependent on adequate documentation for reconstruction. In considering 
creator's-rights the standard 'prejudicial to honour or reputation' would be utilised and 
satisfied in these cases, the destruction of an office memoranda is likely to have 
negligible effect on the reputation of the author. If the author feels particularly strongly 
about the specific work there should be provision made for reclamation of the work at 
their expense. 
Although by no means specific, these considerations are important when considering the 
enactment of creator's-rights. Whatever is enacted and in whatever form it cannot help 
but lay a foundation for development. There needs to be a number of changes in the way 
New Zealand views its authors. As Cornish comments on the new creator's-rights 
provisions in the United Kingdom Copyright, Designs and Patents Act l 988: 1"'7 
Let us hope for one thing rrom the explicil adoption or moral rights C'O 110111i11e in English Law: 
that the significance of the root idea will begin to penetrate judicial altitudes. so as to lay a 
foundation for somewhat less meagre protection in future statutes. 
And futther: 
147 
While the new statutory provisions lay very considerable constraints on the operation of the new 
law. there also remains room to manoeuvre by the courts. They should strive to ensure that the 
less established and the less self possessed authors. artists :1nd directors have a degree or aid in 
establishing norms of reasonable commercial behaviour among those who exploit their creations. 
The new provisions do not have to he treated as tokenism. 
Above n I 15 at p452. 
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CONCLUSION 
There is no possibility of an author obtaining full protection of creator's-rights as 
required under a1ticle 6bis of the 1928 Rome revision under current New Zealand law. 
This is an unfortunate circumstance as not only does it leave New Zealand in breach of a 
treaty obligation but it is a sad reflection on the treatment of authors in a country which 
values highly its cultural heritage. The historical economic bias of New Zealand's 
copyright laws is no excuse. The important role creator's-rights have must be 
acknowledged. It is to be hoped that discussion of these rights will be encouraged, and 
that information will be available in the forthcoming copyright reform to prevent New 
Zealanders from falling foul of the doggerel where Tom Brown said of his tutor: ''I do 
not love thee Dr Fell/The reason why I cannot tell" to ensure that creator's-rights 
legislation will be enacted. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Section 62 Copyright Act 1962 
( ! )The restrictions imposed by this sec tion shall have effec t in relation to literary. dramatic. musica l or 
artistic works; and any reference in this sec tion to a work shall be construed as a reference to such a work. 
(2) A person ( in this subsection referred to as " the offender") contravenes those restri ctions as respec ts 
another person iL without the licence of that other person. he docs an y of the foll ow ing acts in New 
Zealand . that is to say. he-
(a)Insert s or affi xes th at other person' s name in or on a work of which that person is not the 
author. or in or on a reproduction of such a work in in such a way as to impl y that the 
other person is the author of the work: or 
(b)Publishes.or sells or lets for hire. or by way of trade offers or exposes for sale or hire. or by 
way of trade exhibit s in public. a work on which th e other person' s name has been so 
inserted or affixed. if the the offender' s knowledge that person is not the author of the work ; 
or 
(c)Does any of the acts mentioned in paragraph(b) of this subsec tion in rchltion to. or distributes. 
reproductions of a work . being reproductions in or on which th t: other persons name has 
been so inserted or affixed. if to the offenders know ledge that person is not the author of the 
work ; or 
(d)Performs in public. or broadcasts. a work of which the other person is not the author. as being 
a work or which he is the auth or. if to the offendcr ·s know ledge that person is not the 
author of the work . 
(3)Subsection (2) of this section shall apply where. contrary to the fact. a work is represented as being an 
adaption of the work of another person as it applies where a work is so represented as being the work or 
another person . 
(4)In the case or an artistic work which has been altered after the author prn·tcd with the possession of it . 
the said restri ctions arc contravened. in relation to the author. by a person who in New Zealand . without 
the licence of the author. -
Ca) Publishes. sell s. or lets for hire or by way or trade offers or exposes for sa le the work as so 
altered. as being the unaltered work of the author; or 
(b)Publi shes. sells. or lets fo r hire. or by way or trade offers or ex poses for sa le or hire a 
reproduction of the work as so alt t:recl. as being a reproduction of the unaltered work of the 
author.-
if to his knowledge it is not the unaltered work. or. as the case may be. a reproduction of the unaltered 
work of the author. 
(S)Subscctions (2) .(3) . and (4) of this sec tion shall appl y with respec t to an ythin g done in relation to 
another persons after that person's death . as if any reference to that person' s licence were a reference to a 
licence given by him or by his personal representatives: 
Provided that nothing in those subsec tions shall appl y to an ythin g clone in relation to a person more 
than 20 years after that persons death . 
(6)In the case of an arti stic work in which copyright subsists. the said n.:stri ctions arc also contravened. in 
relation to the author of the work . by a person who in New Zcaland-
(a)Publishcs. or se ll s or lets for hire. or by way of trade offers or exposes for sale or hire. or by 
way of trade exhibits in public. a reproduction of the work . as being a reproduction made 
by the author of the work : or 
(b)Distributes reproductions of the work as being reproductions made by the author of the work.-
if (in any such case) the reproduction or reproductions was or were to hi s know ledge not made by the 
author. 
(7)The preceding provisions of this sec tion shall apply (w ith the necessary modifications) with respec t to 
acts done in relation to 2 or more persons in connec tion wi th the same work . 
(8)The restri ctions imposed by thi s sec tion shall not be enforceable by any criminal proceedings; but 
contravention of those res trictions. in relati on to a person. shall be acti onable at his suit. or. if he is dead 
at the suit of his personal representati ves. as a breach or statutory dut y. 
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(9)Any damages recovered under this section by personal representatives, in respect of a contravention 
committed in relation to a person after his death. shall devolve as part of his estate, as if the right of 
action had subsisted and had been vested in him immediately before his death. 
(lO)Nothing in this section shall derogate from any right of action or other remedy (whether civil or 
criminal))) in proceedings instituted otherwise than by vi11ue of this section: 
Provided that this subsection shall not be construed as requiring any damages recovered by virtue of this 
section to be disregarded in assessing damages in any proceedings instituted otherwise than by virtue of 
this section arising out of the same transaction. 
(I l)ln this section "name" includes initials or a monogram. 
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